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Common Law, and Privacy in Computer-Mediated Environments
Stephen Cooper1

Computer-mediated environments pose a special challenge to our legal and cultural protections
of privacy. These environments are unprecedented in the way commercially valuable information
can be generated in their very use. The ease and low cost with which electronic information can
be gathered and disseminated in these environments have led many to advocate regulation
protecting privacy interests from commercial encroachment. At the same time, the use of digital
communications to support criminal or terrorist activities have led others to advocate regulation
allowing law enforcement agencies to eavesdrop or intercept. The cultural history of the Internet
as a self-regulating, almost anarchical, environment provides an interesting background to this
issue. Many writers have looked to statutory law for a solution to the issues of control over, and
commercial or governmental use of information about individuals. This article contends that the
current discussions have overlooked the potential of common law and market forces to
satisfactorily balance the conflicting interests.
The evolution of computer-mediated environments (CME) has placed increasing pressure on
our legal protection of privacy. As electronic databases gradually merge into what some scholars
have termed the digital library (Fox, Akscyn, Furuta, & Leggett, 1995; Kantor, 1994) and
electronic searching tools grow more sophisticated (Rao, Pedersen, Hearst, Mackinlay, Card,
Masinter, Halvarsen, & Robertson, 1995), and as the commercial goal of "information at your
fingertips" gets closer to fulfillment (Gates, 1995b), many fear the complete erosion of
individuals' control of information about themselves. There are good reasons to wonder if loss of
privacy may well be a negative externality of the digital library. As computer-mediated environments overcome time and space as barriers to information access, they also erode time and space
as de facto enforcers of privacy interests.
Our legal recognition of a right to privacy dates to the Yellow Journalism era in the late
nineteenth century. Then, the concern was over intrusive reporters and the public disclosure of
information considered to be private; the call was for common law recognition of a privacy right.
Now, the concern is over the accumulation of and control over electronic data describing
individuals, data which have ever-increasing value in the commercial marketplace. Some call
now for legislation or regulation to control the acquisition and distribution of such information.
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This paper will argue, contrary to much conventional wisdom, that statutory protection is not
necessarily the best option open to us, and that the privacy torts of our common law can be
applied to computer-mediated environments. The paper reviews the historical and social roots of
our privacy rights, briefly outlines the privacy protections which have evolved in our common
law, describes some of the ways CMEs confound statutory law, and outlines how our common
law and free market may respond to those stresses (*1).
The Origins of the Idea of Privacy
Prior to industrialization and urbanization, privacy in the form of solitude was simply a
feature of daily life (Hixson, 1987). Spatial isolation and very limited means of mediating
communication made privacy readily available. Changes in social structures and communication
media in the second half of the nineteenth century threatened what had, up to that time, been a
given.
Greater population density in urban areas increased the frequency of unwanted social contact.
The rise of the mass market newspaper (the "Penny Press") and the professionalization of news
reporting furthered both the appetite for information and the mechanism by which it could be
commoditized, thus threatening the individual's control over personal information (Cooper,
1995). In a parallel to our own time, commercial pressures within the mass media industry
(then, newspapers; now, television) led to the "Yellow Journalism" style, characterized by what
at the time were shockingly personal disclosures (Dicken-Garcia, 1989, pp. 185-186).
Concern over the intrusiveness of the press had reached so high a state by the end of the nineteenth century that a pair of young lawyers published an article advocating legal recognition of a
privacy right in the Harvard Law Review. In their essay, "The Right to Privacy," Samuel D.
Warren and Louis D. Brandeis argued for common law recognition of a fundamental "right of
the individual to be let alone" (1890, p. 205). Just as the common law had gradually extended its
protection from harm to persons and tangible property to harm to ideas and intellectual property,
they argued that the law should also recognize the individual's ownership of an "inviolate
personality" (Cooper, 1995, pp. 104-1 06; Warren & Brandeis, 1890, p. 205).
Common Law Protection of Privacy
In the time since the publication of the Warren and Brandeis article, common law has evolved
to recognize four distinct privacy torts. Statutory protection has been uneven. A few states have
passed privacy laws, but most have extended common law recognition instead (Pember, 1972,
pp. 231-232, 267-270). Supreme Court consideration of privacy rights is rather recent (summarizeed in Hixson, 1989, p. 495 ff.), dating to the Time v. Hill case decided in 1967 (*2). At this
time Federal legislation has taken up privacy concerns in a piecemeal fashion; unlike the privacy
torts, Federal statutes have applied to particular types of information, databases, situations, or
media.
It is useful to review the common law torts of privacy, as they contain the broadest conception
of a right to privacy, and because they provide for direct compensation to the party whose
privacy has been injured. Prosser (1960, p. 389 ff.) identified four distinct torts: intrusion, public
disclosure, false light, and appropriation.
The tort of intrusion originally protected against physical presence in a space thought to
condition an expectation of privacy. It was broadened, as technology raised the possibility of less

obvious intrusion, to such situations as wire tapping, covert recording of speech, blood tests, and
access to bank records. A necessary ingredient for a successful intrusion tort is a space rightfully
expected to be private; a photograph taken in a public place is not considered intrusion.
The public disclosure of private facts tort protects against certain kinds of publicity. The tort
requires that the disclosure be public, that the facts be private and not public information (and
thus, matters of public record are not protected), and that the facts be objectionable or offensive
in some way.
The false light tort is similar to defamation. This tort allows recovery if remarks are falsely
attributed to one, or one's image falsely associated with some activity or object. Again, there is a
requirement that the information be in some way objectionable or offensive to contemporary
mores.
The appropriation tort protects against use of some aspect of one's identity without consent.
Early cases concerned use of photographic images for advertising purposes, and this tort can be
seen as protecting the individual's proprietary interest in his or her identity.
Prosser comments that the evolution of these torts has been a compromise between privacy
interests and the First Amendment protection of a free press (1960, p. 410), since so many of the
cases involved newspapers or broadcasting. Along the way an important distinction has been
drawn between the privacy rights of a public figure, and a private figure. A person can voluntarily waive some degree of protection by running for public office or purposely becoming a
celebrity. A person can also involuntarily lose some degree of protection by being involved in a
newsworthy event, or generating some kind of record deemed public, such as a criminal
conviction.
A number of points are of particular application to computer-mediated environments. First, a
public figure, whether voluntary or involuntary, is in general less protected than a private figure.
Second, newsgathering has been allowed a degree of latitude concerning privacy interests which
other commercial activities have not enjoyed. Third, prevailing notions of the offensiveness or
sensitivity of certain information (i.e., the mores issue) are important in determining the degree
to which the information is privileged.
The Difficulty With Statutory Protection of Privacy
The central problem for protection of privacy is that both technology and the marketplace
stress our expectations of privacy, which are, at bottom, cultural norms. Although they were
written over a century ago, the words of Warren and Brandeis still seem to frame the problem
well: "recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step which must be taken
for the protection of the person" (1890, p. 195).
A recent development is the complexity of the privacy problem in CMEs. Privacy concerns
now involve not just journalism, but also law enforcement, national security, counter-terrorism
measures, workplace monitoring, product marketing, government record-keeping, personal
correspondence, electronic commerce, and digital money. One aspect of the problem is that
CMEs complete the erosion of spatial and temporal isolation as controls on information flow;
information in electronic form is much easier to access, pool, reproduce, and transport. Moreover, computer-mediated communications, unlike previous media, create new and valuable
information in their use. The convenience of CMEs, which offers the promise of a world-wide
electronic commerce (Kalakota & Whinston, 1996) and ready access to a tremendous quantity of
information (Gates, 1995b), also creates the problem of transaction-generated or telecommunica-

tion-generated records which can be used to compile profiles of individuals (National Telecommunications and Information Administration, 1995). The productivity of computer networking in
the business world is accompanied by the specter of covert surveillance of workers (Privacy
Rights Clearinghouse, 1993). Our excitement about the information riches of the digital library is
tempered by the realization of how transparent an intrusion may be.
Securing the Channel
One aspect of the privacy issue is the matter of protecting messages against interception. The
obvious legislative step has already been taken, but the problem created by CMEs is much more
difficult than that of earlier media. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Public
Law 99-508, made it illegal to intercept or disclose the content of electronic communications
("Excerpts From ..., " not dated), and provided for both civil and criminal penalties against
anyone not under color of law doing so. The Act defines content as "any information concerning
the substance, purport, or meaning," and electronic communication as "any transfer of signs,
signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in
part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photo-electronic, or photo-optical system." In short, this
statute extends wiretapping laws into the province of CMEs.
However well-intended, this will not bring the issue to closure. CMEs have made the task of
balancing state interests (law enforcement, national security) against individual interests
(privacy, anonymity) far more complex than that, as the debate over encryption shows. While
one might have expected that statutory controls over earlier electronic media could readily be
adapted to CMEs, two factors have made such a transition problematic. One is cultural: many
users of CME's have made it clear they place a very high value on privacy and anonymity,
strongly oppose government interception of content for any reason, and advocate the general
availability of robust encryption technology to private citizens (e.g., "G7 Threat Alert," 1996;
Hughes, 1993; Levy, 1996; May, not dated; "Sidebars," 1996). It seems reasonable to see this
cultural value as a legacy of the Internet's origins among academics and computer hackers
(Hoffman & Novak, 1994), groups in which authority is questioned and personal autonomy
cherished.
The problem is not simply that individual desire and preference are in conflict with law
enforcement interests, however. Another factor is that the development of viable electronic
commerce requires robust security of transactions (Matonis, 1995; "Netbill Overview," 1995).
As advocates of deregulating encryption put it, "technological progress has moved encryption
from the realm of national security into the commercial sphere" (Simons & Snyder, 1996). Both
individuals and corporate entities share concerns about access to information about their
transactions. Developing a form of digital money (Camp, Sirbu, & Tygar, not dated; McClellan,
1995), that is, a secure way to settle transactions over the network, is a critical facet of the
encryption issue. In short, surveillance of digital communications, whether by law enforcement
authorities (Galkin, 1996) or by employers (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 1993), is a bugaboo
to many CME users.
The story of the Clipper chip, a proposed hardware encryption device which would have
allowed court-approved eavesdropping, illustrates the complexity of this issue. Proponents
argued for legislation requiring use of the Clipper chip in digital transmissions, as a technological way to balance privacy needs and law enforcement needs (Denning, 1994). Opposition to the
Clipper chip was quite heated, for the reasons outlined above. The Clipper chip was intended to

enable government authorities to eavesdrop on digital communications, when given permission
by a court, but to secure the transmissions against any other interception. The Clinton administration's enthusiasm for the Clipper chip waned after a researcher discovered a way to circumvent
the need for the encryption keys, which were to have been available only to government authorities (Cranor, 1995). Technology moves much faster than legislation; if the Clipper chip had
been mandated, it would have been obsolete before the law could be implemented, and in fact
might have created even more severe problems. Once the encryption algorithm had been
"cracked," it no longer could protect transmissions against third-party interception.
It is not obvious that technology alone can resolve the encryption controversy to all parties'
satisfaction. What does seem clear, however, is that the volatile mix of technology, business
practice, and cultural values will continue to make a legislative solution elusive.
The Dilemma of Electronic Dossiers
The relative ease and low cost of assembling data scattered across different databases into
revealing profiles of individuals have prompted concerns of a different nature. One journalist
was able to construct profiles of a number of prominent Californians, including "financial, legal,
marital, and residential histories," using only legally accessible information obtained from online commercial and government sources (Piller, 1993). If anything, we can expect this to be
easier in the future:
A likely byproduct of greater user-friendliness in computer technology is
erosion of the gatekeeper's role: more people will be able to access more data
on their own. A likely byproduct of market competition among database
services is lower pricing: the financial commitment to such inquiry will be
smaller. A likely byproduct of networking is greater convenience: records that
had formerly been scattered across many discrete databases will be pooled
(Cooper, 1995, p. 112).
The privacy concerns about such business practices have been used to argue for general
availability of robust encryption (Chaum, 1992; Gilmore, 1991), but this misses the heart of the
matter. The real issue here is the ease with which a great number of scattered bits of information
-- most revealed voluntarily, some generated incidentally in the course of our daily lives, none of
which would give us much pause -- can be assembled by a third party into a profile of ourselves
which we might find overly revealing (Katsh, 1989, pp. 195-196). A new problem for privacy
protection is that no intrusion into private space is required; the data are simply "out there" for
the compiling.
Why such data profiles should be so valuable to commercial interests is a point worth considering. The concerns have been aired, but the potential benefits to consumers have been given
short shrift. Data mining to support target marketing is one reason for the interest in customer
profiles. When firms can target products with less marketing cost, there is potential benefit to
both the organization (reduced costs, expanded markets) and the consumer (lower pricing, more
specialized products, better need satisfaction). In addition, some firms use such profiles to reduce
the risk of dealing with clients unknown to them. A bank, for instance, uses a credit history to
justify extending a mortgage to a person with whom it has never done business before. In an
increasingly mobile and anonymous society, such use of electronic data can provide benefit to

consumers even as it raises questions about their loss of control over information about themselves (Kling, Ackerman, & Allen, 1994). Simply prohibiting such profiles altogether has the
unintended consequence of preventing certain market benefits. As Varian (1996a) points out, the
real concern is how best to guarantee that people can retain their property rights in information
about themselves.
In sum, the mix of business practice, social priorities, technological development, and personal autonomy is quite complex. Some believe encryption technology will, in the end, decisively
restore control to the individual (Chaum, 1992), whatever the trade-off in law enforcement interests. Others worry that the march of technology-enabled disclosure is inexorable. It does seem,
however, that the power of market forces to enforce privacy interests tends to be overlooked.
We should note that Lotus Development was forced to abandon plans to market a database of
household demographics in the face of public outcry (Kling, Ackerman, & Allen, 1994). In
similar fashion, Lexis-Nexis was driven to disable features of their P-TRAK database when
faced with Internet-fueled protests (Weber, 1996).
How Common Law and the Marketplace Can Protect Privacy
A number of difficulties with statutory protection have been noted above. The pace of
technological evolution is so rapid, the range of communication technologies so broad, the
economic consequences of delaying policy decisions so costly, and the positions so polarized
that a legislative approach may at best be ineffective, and at worst, outright damaging. CMEs
differ from prior media in speed, geographic reach, and cost structure. While our first response to
the awareness of a social problem is often, "there oughta be a law!" it is doubtful at this point
that the political process can produce an intelligent, comprehensive statute which adequately
addresses the needs of all the stakeholders. Clearly, statute or regulation runs a significant risk of
unintended consequences, such as inhibiting development of information services or products, or
preventing cost savings in marketing (*3).
While it may be rhetorically attractive to advocate a decisive legislative or regulatory fix, it is
not a given that individuals' privacy interests will be well served in the political arena, given the
fluidity of both the technologies supporting computer-mediated environments and our behaviors
in those environments. There are a number of reasons to expect a better solution to emerge from
common law than from regulation:
•
•
•
•

Common law is "bottom-up" (case-driven) rather than "top down"
(legislation-driven)
It diffuses enforcement power among a variety of courts, rather than
concentrating it within an agency
It may thus be better at avoiding or mitigating unintended consequences
It provides direct compensation to victims.

To be sure, common law has its own set of problems in addressing privacy concerns. For it to
operate, the injured party must file suit; this requires the resources to take legal action, and the
awareness that one has been victimized. As noted above, we generate data about ourselves when
we engage in such routine activities as shopping or renewing our car registration, and it possible
that many people could become complacent about the commercial use of that data, even after

they become aware of the data's existence. Another criticism of common law is that damage
awards can be inconsistent, across jurisdictions and jurists. Still, there is little to suggest that we
are, as a ·society, averse to filing tort actions, including class action suits. Moreover, a single
damage award in a privacy case can profoundly impact industry practice.
The major privacy concerns regarding computer-mediated environments can be grouped into
three broad categories, which map readily onto the privacy torts in this way:
•
•
•

Issues of workplace surveillance and monitoring of digital communications are
essentially questions of intrusion and expectation of privacy
Issues of transaction-generated data and access to electronic records are essentially
questions of disclosure
Issues of electronic profiles are essentially false light questions when made public,
and appropriation questions when sold on the market (*4).

In addition, we should not overlook the extent to which the information market regulates itself. Information service providers will be keenly aware of barriers to adoption of their services,
one of which is clients' perception that using the service generates information about themselves
which they cannot control. While not endorsing self-regulation as a complete solution to the
problem of telecommunications-related personal information (TRPI), the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration has recognized that in a competitive
market, "privacy is one of the terms on which businesses struggle for customers and where
consumers can walk away from transactions that do not provide adequate privacy protection"
(NTIA, 1995). Control over transaction-generated information can very well be a contractual
matter between providers
and their customers, and not a statutory question. In short, there are a number of forces in the
marketplace which also can protect privacy interests, including the rational choices of consumers
and producers, the libertarian bent of cyber-culture, encryption technologies, and the scrutiny of
a "watchdog" press.
While there has been much support for government intervention regarding privacy (e.g.,
Gates, 1995a; Shapiro, 1997; Varian, 1996b, pp. 15-16), and concern about possible collateral
damage to privacy interests from indirectly related legislation (e.g., Electronic Privacy
Information Center, 1995), less attention has been given LO the ways the common law of
privacy may be able to react to technological and market challenges. This paper has argued the
contrary position that regulation may well be inferior to common law in several respects.
Legislation runs a significant risk of unintended negative consequences, particularly by inhibiting potential market efficiencies. Legislation can also produce a false sense of security, and
incline us to overlook action we can voluntarily take, as individuals, to protect our privacy
interests. By contrast, extending the common law torts into computer-mediated environments
makes good use of existing legal, economic, and cultural antecedents, and creates a legal context
better able to cope with rapidly evolving technologies and uses of these environments.
Endnotes
(*l) Many of the sources used here were obtained from the Internet; URL's and e-mail addresses
were current at the time of writing.

(*2) Hixson (1989), Pember ( 1972). and Cooper (1995) contain more detail on the essential
privacy cases than space permits here.
(*3) For a full discussion of the idea of regulatory failure, see Mitchell and Simmons (1994).
(*4) One legal scholar expects a new tort to evolve, which allows recovery against such
electronic profiles (Smolla, 1992. pp. 149-150).
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